The Commission's exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to impose the separation requirement on AT & T is an integral part of the Computer II regulatory scheme. Several parties attack the validity of this assertion of ancillary jurisdiction by the Commission. In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 88 S.Ct. 1994, 20 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1968), it was settled beyond peradventure that the Commission may assert jurisdiction under section 152(a) of the Act over activities that are not within the reach of Title II.78 In that case, however, the Supreme Court limited the Commission's jurisdiction to that which is “reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities.” One of those responsibilities is to assure a nationwide system of wire communications services at reasonable prices.....
In designing the Communications Act, Congress sought “to endow the Commission with sufficiently elastic powers such that it could readily accommodate dynamic new developments in the field of communications.” Congress thus hoped “to avoid the necessity of repetitive legislation.” In Computer II the Commission took full advantage of its broad powers to serve the public interest by accommodating a new development in the communications industry, the confluence of communications and data processing. Because the Commission's judgment on “how the public interest is best served is entitled to substantial judicial deference,” the Commission's choice of regulatory tools in Computer II must be upheld unless arbitrary or capricious. Our review of the Commission's decision convinces us that the Commission acted reasonably in defining its jurisdiction over enhanced services and CPE. We therefore uphold the Computer II scheme.
Quick followup: Since your blogging software seems to have mangled the URL in the message above, I have run it through TinyURL. To view Comcast's memo, see
http://preview.tinyurl.com/...
which explains in detail why current law prohibits the FCC from regulating small and independent ISPs out of business — leaving a duopoly and destroying consumer choice. It's not legal to do so, no matter how much you, Larry Lessig, Tim Wu, and other “inside the Beltway” lawyers would like to do it.
Brett:
You started sos trong, then devolved to blah blah blah Ginger.
Or, from Dilbert's “Seven Habits of Highly annoying People”: You will not realize this carton is about you.
Alas, Harold, that cartoon appears to be more about you than about me. Instead of addressing the substance of my argument, you're reacting solely to the name at the top of my posting — just like the dog in the cartoon.
Ok - let's assume Title I authority is as broad as we think. And let's assume that we want to impose say 3 regulations (X, Y, Z) on broadband access. Are we now indifferent b/w the following scenarios:
1 - Title I regulation with XYZ added
2 - Title II regulation with forbearance of everything except XYZ
I'm just trying to think through the implications of a wide reading of Title I in terms of service classifications.
Publius:
It depends on the regulations. Title II is very useful because it includes both an explicit grant of authority and certain mandatory elements. Given that I believe that broadband access serves the same essential function as plain old telephone service (POTS) or any other straightforward transmission of information (e.g., snail mail), my inclination is to require a good reason to eliminate basic common carrier regulation rather than shift the burden to those seeking common carrier status for the transmission of information from one point to another. Which is a long-winded way of saying I prefer your Option 2 — Title II regulation with forbearance.
Title I is useful if what we desire is a complete delegation of authority to the expert agency, guided only by the general intent of Congress. That outcome has advantages and disadvantages depending on how much one trusts such delegations in general and the FCC in particular. I am uncomfortable with having broadband access under Title I rather than Title II both because I think the statutory hair splitting was wrong — what the provider advertises is the service of transporting information back and forth with an expectation that the provider will not interfere in the traffic, fine print be damned — and because Title II contains a much more comprehensive set of responsibilities and limitations on both carriers and regulators. Title II was designed for a world where it is expected that there will be some small number of carriers with market power and that consumers are not in a position to bargain effectively with carriers. Title I has no assumptions other than “FCC, go make sure we have kick ass communications in this country for everyone.”
At the same time, it is also reasonable to argue that Title II is based on an assumption that networks evolve slowly, and may be ill-suited to the current pace of technological innovation. Even the forbearance proceeding, supporters of Title I will argue, takes too much time and is subject to the evils of regulatory processes.
A compromise might be a statutory provision similar to that used for cell phones. Section 332 of the Communications Act recognizes that cell phone providers are not generally Title II carriers, but should be treated as such for purposes of Sections 201 and 202 of the Act, and the Commission may apply any other provision of Title II at its discretion. This captures the critical network aspects (interconnection, non-interference with traffic, power to set just and reasonable rates and practices) without the additional regulations arguably designed for a different era.
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Harold, disparaging ad hominem remarks, such as the ones you have directed at me above do not help your argument or Marvin's, but they do hurt your image. And your credibility.
For an simple, elegant rebuttal of Marvin's strained, flawed, and self-servingly one sided analysis, see:
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/pr...
Also, remember that the author of the FCC's four “principles,” Michael Powell, himself said that he did not believe that they were enforceable and hence should not be construed as rules.
Of course, the above will not prevent the lawyers and lobbyists — who want to earn money by creating “crises” and then soliciting money to deal with them — from bloviating on the subject.