Among subsidies, price discrimination, volume discounts, exclusivity and third party purchase problems, subsidy is the most important.
A comparison is ink or toner cartridge refills which can easily cost more than the printer, but under effective competition, the latter cannot “subsidize” the former as part of a competitively priced package, the price that counts and would be driven to cost with normal profit (no economic profit).
Once the subsidy is gone due to competition, so is price discrimination, where volume discounts are reflected in price as a cost variance. Exclusivity wouldn't matter due to substitutes, nor would third party payers, such as health insurers who would sell insurance and not overpriced health care (the “discounts” are overpriced already, and the non-discounts are obscene).
However, effective competition is absent in most of these cases, so the package price remains above economic cost due to various forms of market power, and that's where the true source of a subsidy comes into play, the ability to raise price in one market in order to charge below market price in another, particularly when the objective is to lock in the customer from future choices.
One aspect you didn't address at all in this article is that handset exclusivity is one of the driving forces in customers changing carriers. Hanging out in wireless forums, I find it is a big motivation for some to switch. When you have phones like the iPhone, the Pre and now Droid, you are going to get people to move, especially if they aren't satisfied with their selection.
Also, I'm not sure if I agree with your theory about the effect of subsidies on smaller carriers. For example, Verizon heavily subsidizes their phones, but their rate plans tend to be pricey. T-Mobile's subsidies tend to be lower, but so are their rate plans. One problem that I haven't been able to figure out is the logic of why one phone goes to one carrier and another goes to another carrier.
Ending exclusivity doesn't solve the problem by itself. There is the problem of incompatibilities between networks. While Sprint and Verizon phones probably could be made compatible, they aren't because of differences in software. I also don't see the will for anyone to make compatible phones. (Tho, Sprint has made phones that run on both their Sprint and Nextel networks, so it is possible to do such things.)
Things are a bit easier on the GSM side of things, but there is still the issue that AT&T and T-Mobile's 3G networks use different frequencies. It is still an oddity that Nokia's N900 will be compatible with T-Mobile's 3G network, but not AT&T's. Maybe they are aiming at an exclusive with T-Mobile, tho there hasn't been any solid information that they will do it. Meanwhile, the unlocked version is on their way to retailers.
Longshot:
You may be right that equipment differentiation is useful to the carrier, which is why they want to preserve it. The question to me, from a policy stand point, is whether that is a good consumer benefit. Does making this an adjunct to the carrier improve innovation? Does it lower price? I think in both cases, the answer is no. Equipment manufacturers have incentive to innovate in handsets if we eliminate exclusivities. Indeed, they arguably have more incentive, because they can capture more of the profit of innovation. My response to cost is, of course, the subject of the post.
There is a third argument, which is that these are matters of private contract and it is inappropriate to meddle with them except under extraordinary circumstances. Even if we accept this as the general case (and I will agree it is a reasonable approach in a typical market), the problem with the wireless market, as I've discussed in previous posts, is that it is not very contestable. As structured, the wireless market has a limited number of competitors set by the need to acquire a government-issued license for spectrum use. IMO we therefore either eliminate spectrum licensing as a pre-requisite of using spectrum (not merely convert licenses into property, perpetuating the government monopoly) or we accept that wireless markets are not standard markets and require additional intervention.
You can pay two different prices for the same good, depending on whether you are being subsidized or not; Blackberry is receiving different prices for the same good, depending whether or not the Blackberry in question is part of Verizon's bulk purchase or not (one of the things the FCC could usefully investigate is the actual cash flows there; is there a further subsidy, rebate, or drawback between Verizon and Blackberry?)
This economic structure is not a market; there is no market price. It is not a market in order to inhibit A's captive customers from losing their brand loyalty. Therefore (by Hayek's definition) it is not free - some buyers are inhibited from dealing with some sellers.
And the contracts being offered are constraints on trade; indeed, they change your position from a contracting party to the status of Omnia client. You can buy your way out (this time), but the direction of this road is clear.
This is the classical prediction of the effect of subsidies; whether they are public or private subsidies is less important.
Incompatibility between networks is not a new problem; it has always been dealt with by compatibility standards. Again, whether those standards come from Underwriter's Laboratory or the FCC is a question of detail.
Try this on for size. What if a few years ago some one said to you that you will be offered phone service, at majorly increased pricing than your current service. In addition you will lose the capability of multiple phones on a single line, the service will have intermitent lapses, drop the calls in mid sentence, have less flexibility than your current service and be restricted regionally. What you gain would be portability, gadgets on the phone itself and a loss of privacy. And the phones themselves would be priced in the hundreds of dollars range. Would you have bought into it?
It's not clear what problem you're trying to solve here, Harold. In the net neutrality debate, I understand that advocates of increased regulation of Internet access concede that the system is working well today, and they want to ensure that it works well in the future as well. In the wireless handset business,the argument is apparently that the system is not working well today but that it would with a ban on contracts between operators and manufacturers. But these contracts have been a feature of wireless from the beginning, and are essentially a world-wide phenomenon. They're especially important in the US because we have diversity in both technology (CDMA and UMTS) and in frequencies (T-Mobile's 2100 Mhz AWS-2). Historically, operators had handsets made to order to fit their networks, and expanded on this system to compete with each other. People used to care a lot about which carrier they had, but now seem to be more interested in the handset; if you want an iPhone, you can get one, and anybody who complains about lock-in to a carrier other than AT&T made their choice well after the iPhone was introduced over two years ago, so what's the problem?
In our technically diverse environment, things are as they are. After the transition to LTE networks will be more uniform and portability will be more practical, but I don't see why it's a real concern today.
This is a nice analysis and it advances the debate quite about on subsidies and handset exclusivity. But toward the end of the post I had to laugh at this statement --
“Handset exclusivity should result in an overall drop in price for handsets as box stores once again capture the volume discounts and share them with the market as a whole. The exception potentially being Verizon and AT&T customers...”
Verizon and ATT customers are 60% of the market! So ending handset exclusivity will actually result in higher handset prices for 60% of the market, and lower the price for 40% of buyers? Why would government want to do that?
That sounds like the FCC's attempt at cable rate regulation in 1994 which resulted in 1/3 of all cable subs actually paying higher rates after the regs took effect (seriously - look it up).
Paul:
This is a good point. My sense is it should be mitigated by the fact that neither AT&T nor Verizon can achieve the same volume discounts as Wal*Mart and Best Buy, because the percentage of the market they can hope to capture is smaller. Verizon can only give a manufacturer a subset of its own customers, whereas a large retailer offers a segment of customers of all providers. What is needed here are actual numbers provided by manufacturers and network operators so the FCC can make a determination.
I also point out that the subsidy issue is only one point in the balance. The competition and innovation arguments are usually the first argument, to which the response is the subsidy argument. My analysis suggests the subsidy argument is overstated. All of this is balancing multiple factors.
Harold, who gave YOU the right to mandate a balance of these factors that you like, rather than allowing the market to decide? There is no need for regulation here; the market is working.
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And really, what do you get from a Blackberry that you couldn't get in a Palm Tungsten C, for $350, 7 years ago? The cost of electronics usually goes down with time, not up. Color screen, keyboard, radio (Palm had WiFi, this has cell radio), small computer - that's a smartphone. There's no reason it should cost $680 on the open market. $4-500, maybe. I'd really think more like $300. But since you have to buy it through this or that middleman, who wants their cut, it gets more expensive.